

analysis to advance the health of vulnerable populations

### Balancing LTC: Can More Home and Community-Based Support Save Money While Improving Care?

Dual Eligibles in Maryland AcademyHealth Annual Research Meeting Charles Milligan June 28, 2010



# **Preview of Presentation**

Overview of Project

Results

Selected Policy Implications



# **Overview of Project**



# The overall project goals

- Look at cross-payer effects for dual eligibles in Maryland
- One subgroup analysis: Look at the cross-payer effects for dual eligibles who meet nursing facility level of care (NF LOC), both in the community and in institutions
- The major non-Developmental Disabilities HCBS waiver in Maryland is the Older Adults Waiver (OAW)
- The OAW recipients were compared to matched individuals in the community and in LT-NFs

## **Propensity score matching was done for the comparisons**

- The "treatment" was receipt of HCBS waiver services in the OAW. The potential treatment group: 12-month continuously enrolled dual eligibles aged 50+ who were enrolled in the OAW the entire year (2006) (n=1,759)
- Potential controls (community): 12-month continuously enrolled dual eligibles aged 50+ who did not receive Medicaid long-term supports and services in 2006 (n=19,095)
- Potential controls (LT-NF): 12-month continuously enrolled dual eligibles aged 50+ who had ≥ 30 days of Medicaid-paid NF care just prior to January 1, 2006, and had NF care ≥ 10 months of 2006 (n=6,336)



## **Propensity score matching covariates utilized**

# Covariates included in propensity score estimation

- Age
- Gender
- Race
- CMS-HCC relative value
- 20 Chronic Condition Warehouse condition indicators
- Disability as reason for original Medicare entitlement indicator
- Frailty indicator (diagnostic-based, Hopkins ACG system)
- ESRD indicator
- Months of full Medicaid coverage



# Outcome of propensity score matching

- Of the potential treatment group in the OAW (n=1,759):
  - 1,440 matches were found among the potential community control group population of 19,095, so the sub-group analysis proceeded with the 1,440 OAW recipients and the 1,440 individuals in the community control group with whom they "matched"
  - 1,731 matches were found among the potential LT-NF control group population of 6,336, so the sub-group analysis proceeded with the 1,731 OAW recipients and the 1,731 in the LT-NF control group with whom they "matched"

## Results



# Medicare payments were nearly identical for OAW recipients and the community control group . . .

### **MEDICARE Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Service**

\$5,000 Although the overall costs were similar, the \$4,000 OAW group had fewer hospital readmissions, fewer/shorter SNF stays, more home health, **Claim Payments** \$3,000 more DME, and fewer ER encounters, which suggests the OAW recipients received better coordination with Medicare. \$2,000 \$1,219 \$1,302 \$1,000 \$586 \$548 \$425 \$451 \$93 \$90 \$79 \$75 \$60 \$44 \$32 \$38 \$0 Hospital Total SNF Home Health Physician/ DME Hospice Outpatient

■OAW (Treatment) ■Community (Control)


Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,440 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006.



### ... while Medicaid payments were far higher for the OAW recipients than the community control group ...

#### **MEDICAID Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Service**



■OAW (Treatment) ■Community (Control)


Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,440 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006. Medicare crossover payments paid by Medicaid not included.

### ... and as a result, the OAW recipients were far more expensive than the community control group, in total dollars.

#### MEDICARE and MEDICAID Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Service

■OAW (Treatment) ■Community (Control)




Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,440 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006. Medicare crossover payments paid by Medicaid not included.

### Medicare payments were \$441 higher PMPM for the OAW group than the LT-NF control group . . .

#### **MEDICARE Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Service**




■OAW (Treatment) ■LT-NF (Control)

Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,731 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006.

### ... while Medicaid payments were \$2,055 PMPM higher for the LT-NF group, compared to the OAW group ...



**MEDICAID Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Service** 


Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,731 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006. Medicare crossover payments paid by Medicaid not included.

# ... and in total dollars, the OAW was far less expensive than the LT-NF.

### MEDICARE and MEDICAID Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Service

■OAW (Treatment) ■LT-NF (Control)




Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,731 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006. Medicare crossover payments paid by Medicaid not included..

### In sum, in total dollars, the OAW group is far more expensive than the community control group and far less expensive than the LT-NF control group.

### MEDICARE and MEDICAID Benefit Payments, PMPM, by Source of Controls



■OAW (Treatment) ■ Controls


Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Maryland OAW (treatment) and community (control) samples of 1,731 full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006. Medicare crossover payments paid by Medicaid not included.

# While the Medicare payment difference is negligible in the community, the Medicare program saved \$\$ when people were in NFs.

### MEDICARE and MEDICAID Benefit Payments, PMPM,

by Source of Controls




Source: Tucker, A., & Johnson, K. (2010). Cross-Payer Effects on Medicare Resource Use: Lessons for Medicaid Administrators. Baltimore, MD: The Hilltop Institute.

Notes: Both sets of samples: full-benefit duals aged 50 and older, enrolled for 12 months (with no group health coverage) in 2006. Maryland OAW and Community samples: n=1,440; Maryland OAW LT-NF samples: 1,731. Medicare crossover payments paid by Medicaid not included.

### Keep in mind: most discrete SNF/NF stays begin as a post-acute Medicare SNF stay . . .

Source of Payment at Initial Admission, Discrete Stays




Hilltop refined MDS data, Discrete Stays in Maryland, 1999-2008



### ... and the vast majority of "extended" SNF/NF stays begin as a post-acute Medicare SNF stay.

Source of Payment at Initial Admission, Extended Stays



Hilltop refined MDS data, Extended Stays in Maryland, 1999-2008



# **Selected Policy Implications**



# No. 1: Medicare and Medicaid financing don't align to promote HCBS

- Medicare spent less when a dual eligible was in an NF (\$786 PMPM) than it did when a comparable person was in the OAW in the community (\$1,227 PMPM) (and Medicare spent about the same for a comparable person in the community who was not in the OAW or any waiver)
- Medicaid spent less when a dual eligible was in the OAW (\$2,780 PMPM) than it did when a comparable person was in an NF (\$4,835 PMPM)
- Overall, placement in the OAW costs substantially less (\$4,007 PMPM) than placement in an LT-NF (\$5,621 PMPM)
- To align the financial incentives toward community placement, integrated care for dual eligibles must involve one entity that bears the Medicare and Medicaid risk

### No. 2: Because the vast majority of LT-NF admissions begin with a Medicare stay, community integration for dual eligibles must engage Medicare

- From 1999-2008, 74% of all discrete admissions in MD to an SNF/NF began as a Medicare stay, whereas only 15% began as a Medicaid stay (total stays = 648,774)
- Over the same period, 83% of all "extended" stays in MD began as a Medicare stay (total stays = 384,156)
- This emphasizes the need to engage Medicare to promote community-based care of LT-NF admissions for dual eligibles



### No. 3: The OAW only is costeffective for Medicaid when it truly avoids an LT-NF placement

- Offering an OAW slot (\$2,780 PMPM) to an individual who is certain to become an LT-NF resident (\$4,835 PMPM) is cost-effective for Medicaid
- Offering an HCBS waiver slot to an individual (\$2,784 PMPM) who otherwise would remain in the community anyway (\$360 PMPM) is more expensive to Medicaid
- This emphasizes the need for good assessment processes to award slots to people at risk for LT-NF



# **Contact Information**

**Charles Milligan** 

**Executive Director** 

The Hilltop Institute

University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC)

410.455.6274

cmilligan@hilltop.umbc.edu

www.hilltopinstitute.org

